Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California

Legislative Focus Program On Civil-Military Relations

South African Parliament
27-31 May 2002

Eugene Michael Mensch II
Colonel, US Army (retired)

Colonel Mensch is the Africa Program Manager for The Center for Civil-Military Relations. He was commissioned in the United States Army in 1969 and after serving in the Vietnam War, became a foreign affairs specialist. He lived and worked in Africa and the Middle East for thirteen years, becoming a Foreign Area Officer (FAO) for Africa and the Arab World. During that time, he worked as Defense and/or Army Attaché in Chad, Namibia, Tunisia, South Africa, Swaziland, and Lesotho. Colonel Mensch served temporarily in Ethiopia just prior to the bombing of the US Embassy in Nairobi and was dispatched from Ethiopia to assist the embassy staff in Kenya. Colonel Mensch retired from the Army in May 1999. He is the President of Consulting Africa Limited, a consulting services company in Kingston, Ontario, Canada.

Colonel Mensch has a bachelor's degree in Political Science and a Master's degree from the Naval Postgraduate School in Middle Eastern Studies. He is a graduate of the Armed Forces Staff College, The Army War College, The Foreign Service Institute (Arabic), and the Defense Language Institute (Arabic and French). His functional expertise includes multinational operations, civil-military relations, policy development, international liaison, negotiations, political affairs, and crisis management. He is a member of the United States Defense Attaché Hall of Fame.

Colonel Mensch lives with his wife and daughters in Kingston, Ontario, Canada.

Robin (Sak) Sakoda
CCMR Faculty Member

Mr. Sakoda earned a Bachelor's degree in Political Science from the Citadel and a Masters in National Security Affairs from the Naval Postgraduate School. As an Army officer he held positions in Civil-Military Operations, Multi-National Exercise Planning, and Battalion Executive Officer. He was the Aide-de-Camp to the Commanding General, US Army, Japan, serving also as a Japanese-language interpreter for senior US Army officials. Mr. Sakoda spent the last five years of his military career as the Country Director for Japan in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. In that capacity he was responsible for coordinating and implementing security policy among several departments and agencies, and representing the US Government in bilateral talks. As the senior director , his principal focus was to develop policies aimed at moving the US-Japan relationship into the post-Cold War environment. Part of that effort involved the planning and execution of public affairs strategies.

Mr. Sakoda is a consultant for AALC, Ltd. Co., formerly Armitage Associates, L.C., a Washington-based consulting firm.


The purpose of this period of instruction is to welcome participants, introduce the faculty members and outline the program for the seminar.

I. Introduction.
A. Welcome by Seminar Leader.
B. Welcome by American Chief of Mission or his representative and the representative of the South African Government (SAG).
C. Address by keynote speaker (TBD).

II. Introduce Faculty Members.
A. Mr. Robin "Sak" Sakoda
B. Mr. Michael Mensch

III. Purpose of the Seminar.
A. Develop an understanding of the importance of the relationship between the legislative branch and the armed forces.
B. Continue the program begun in 2000 between the Parliament and the Center for Civil-Military Relations. Complements other CCMR/DoD[USG -- SAG bilateral programs.
C. Conduct an in-depth study of how legislators, the military and others can work together to resolve security issues, clarify roles and learn from others' experiences.
D. Produce an action plan that will guide future actions.

IV. Content.
A. Civil-Military Relations in a Democracy.
B. Framework for Civilian Control.
C. Roles & Missions of the Military.
D. Military Professionalism in a Democracy.
E. The Armed Forces and the Legislative Branch.
F. Defense Restructuring.
G. Legislative Aspects of Defense Restructuring.
H. Life Skills Development in the Armed Forces.
I. Base Closures and Realignment.
J. Social Aspects of Defense Restructuring.
L. Small Group Exercises

A. Better understanding of each group's individual and collective responsibilities.
B. Establish an effective system of communication and cooperation between the Parliament and the SANDF/DoD.
C. Develop an Action Plan to guide future contacts and joint efforts.


I. Introduction
A. Democracy
1. Definition (Procedural v. Substantive):
a. Popular sovereignty (maximal, long term substantive goal)
b. Elections (minimal, procedural requirement)
c. Contestation and Participation
4. Alternation and loyal opposition
e. Civil and Political Rights
f. Transparency
g. Responsiveness
h. Rule of Law (long term institutional development)
i. Institutional balance of power (long term institutional development)
2. Role:
a. Freedom - but people must be engaged to hold government accountable (peasants and democracy)
b. Representation - responsibilities to 'the people,' an(to constituents
c. Process conflicts of interest - democracy does not equal social or political harmony
3. Democracy is the worst system of government except for all the others (Winston Churchill)
B. Civil Society
~. Definition:
a. Population at large - collective action problems (popular disengagement a problem in Africa and US)
b. Organized 'national' interests - labor, business, students, women, lawyers, farmers, NOOs - minorities at low level of development, not yet effective in new democracies
c. Subnational/regional interests - centripetal I centrifugal forces - civil society and democracy when nationalism is still weak
d. Political parties
2. Role:
a. Encourage participation
i. Mobilize and educate citizens
ii. Channel social demands to the state
b. Monitor contestation
i. Elections monitoring
ii. Media
c. Maintain linkages between citizens and government
i. Watchdog
ii. Maintain democratic responsiveness of government internally, through a web of interest groups, each seeking to promote its own interest (not altruistic) Military
1. Definition
a. Coercive apparatus - responsible for the management of violence
b. 'Guardians' of what - (current) govemment president, (democratic)
regime, constitution (law), nation (society), borders (minimal)
2. Role
a. Provides professional services to society, its client
i. External defense
ii. Public Order (Civil Conflicts?)
b. Maintenance of professionalism critical because of responsibility for
i. Coup prevention I maintenance of its own institutional coheitnce
ii. Maintenance of its autonomy
iii. Articulation of corporate interests
iv. Subordination to institutiondized, democratic civilian control

II. Consolidated Democracies (50+ years old) (e.g., U.S., Western Europe)
A. Institutions Strong and Entrenched (balance - each defending its power,
prerogatives againit the others)
1. balance of power among executive, legislative, and judicial branches
9 balaice of power among federal, state, and local government
3. balance of power between state and civil society
4. balance of power between civilian authority and military expertise
5. democracy is virtually unassailable due to complexity of institutions and interests
B. Democracy generally works: conflicts not eliminated, but processed successfully (most of the time)
C. Individual politicians as ambitious as anywhere else, but severely constrained by strong institutions
a. U.S. presidential election - candidates tried every (legJ) 5 ategy to tip the balance, t3ut staved within legal strucUre and eventually bowed to ~nstitutional resolution (after struggle between state and federal supreme courts)

III. Consolidating Democracies (20 years old) (e.g., Latin America, Botswana)
A. Institutions beginning to function but still fragile
1. Legislative power has grown substantially, beginning to balance executive
9 Judicial authority established - rule of law emerging
3. Civil society larger. more organized and active but still relatively weak and generally cautious
4. Military still strongest national institution - professional elements must still take steps to consolidate democratic regime and civilian control
B. Democracy works, but imperfectly
C. Individual politicians increasingly constrained by growing institutional strength, but still able to evade to varying degrees

IV. Transitional Democracies
A. Institutions not yet self-sustaining, require additional support
1. Executive branch and/or military still predominant
2. Legislative and Judicial branches only beginning to establish their autonomous authority
3. Civil society has not grown into a web - small, often regionally divided
4. Military still struggling to reform/professionalize itself
B. Democracy is thin, but can still work with constant vigilance on the part of reformers
1. Institutional elements of military and civil society haye shared interests in stable democracy - both suffer under military rule
2. Military and civil society should not be isolated and insulated from one another - must have an ongoing exchange
a. When military is exposed to diverse interests and forces within civil society, it begins to see its role as neutral defense, not dominance of those interests
b. When civil society is exposed to a professionalizing military, it begins to feel Tess threatened, and to appreciate the security provided by the military
3. Civil society/military/government form a triangle of tense, but potentially mutually beneficial relationships
a. Civil society and professional military keep government responsive
b. Civil society and government keep military subordinate and apolitical
c. Military and government keep civil society demands manageable
C. Management of these relationships is crucial when institutions are not (yet) fully functional - individuals much less constrained

V. Institutionalizing Democratic Governance
A. Stage 1 (Transitional Democracies): Establishment and satisfaction of the minimum terms on which social actors will respect democratic rules, based on rational group interests - Faustian bargains to buy time for institutional growth
B. Stage 2 (Consolidating Democracies): Strengthening of institutions and organizations of the polity to ensure respect for the authority and the expressed interests of the collective society, including consolidation of political parties and legislatures
C. Stage 3 (Consolidated Democracies): Eventual establishment of the continuing legitimacy of democracy as transcending particular interests at any given time - democratic values become internalized and diffused and democracy becomes sdf-sustaining only after a long process

I. Constitutional Division of Powers
A. Executive (Policy)
1. Commander-in-Chief
2. Mission identification - broad (e.g., peacekeeping) and specific (e.g., which missions)
B. Legislative (Funds)
1. Financial support - military budget process
2. Oversight - hearings, briefings, reports
C. Military (Operationalization)
1. Strategy
2. Force composition
3. Personnel - hiring, promotions
D. Supported by Judiciary --
a. No illegal orders/inappropriate use of military (protects military professionalism)
b. No political interference (e.g., in appointments promotions) (protects military autonomy)
E. And Civil Society
1. Media (transparency)
2. Lobbies (on all sides)

I. Transitional, Consolidating, and Consolidated Democracies
A. Transitional
1. Constitutional framework is in place, but has not become institutionalized an4 will not function automatically
2. Informal, personalized relationships carried over from previous regime continue to operate at various levels (e.g., clientelism, nepotism)
3. Legislative oversight is compromised by institutional weakness of young legislatures (e.g., defense budget matter of 'national security')
4. Executive power remains personalized, overbearing and largely beyond law
5. Judicial and Civil Society support systems are very weak, which can leave the military with little recourse in the face of illegal orders from the Executive
6. Institutions may be seen as legitimate in theory, but they have not had time to prove themselves efficacious - additional mechanisms may be necessary until institutions take root in the state and society. (If democratic institutions appear to be failing, they lose legitimacy.)
7. In addition, if Constitution is changed readily, it loses much of its force -rules of the game are not fixed and binding
B. Consolidating
1. Civilian control by the executive branch is established, and has developed some institutional strength
2. Legislative authority, which is required for democratic control of the military, is growing but is less ingrained, and more tense
a. Easier for the military to accept the authority of a civilian commander -in-chief, than that of a parliamentary body that may not be well informed about security matters, and is inherently divided, and can't keep secrets very well
3. Judicial and Civil Society supports weaker still, but growing
4. Rule of men in the process of being superceded by rule of law - but this can be an uneasy time as the old system has weakened but the new system is not yet unassailable
C. Consolidated
1. Constitutional framework for democratic civilian control of the military is maintained by a complex balance of interests and power, that has developed slowly over time
2. Institutions have become accepted as legitimate by elite and masses as they have proven efficacious over time

III. Implications for Civil Military Relations in Transitional and Consolidating Democracies
A. In advance of institutional hardening, establishing and maintaining viable civil military relations depends on:
1. Existence of civil sectors both organized and united enough on basic issues of principle to negotiate relationships and guarantees with each other and with the military
2. Legislative self-empowerment with regard to military issues and policies for effective civilian and democratic control
3. Forces within the military far sighted enough to negotiate corporate and professional interests with the government and democratic forces
4. Consensus on balance between military autonomy and civilian authority
5. Military-civilian reform coalitions - military reforms itself in a process approved and legitimized by civilians, and military expertise becomes wedded to civil supremacy in the process
6. These extra-constitutional mechanisms are crucial in transitional democracies, but still relevant to consolidating ones

IV. Conclusion
The difficulty in establishing a framework for civilian control of the military is not so much in identifying the right rules, as in making rules effective and binding on everyone and there is no stock answer on how to do that (trial and error, coalitions, learning from regional successes and failures)

Your group has been appointed to advise the government on issues relating to the establishment of an appropriate framework for civilian control of the military. The mission of your committee is to answer the following questions:

1. Does the country need additional legislative (laws) or executive (policies) action in support of the existing constitutional framework for civilian control of the military? If so, what specific areas require the attention of the government?

2. Are additional institutional supports necessary for guiding or monitoring civil-military relations while the Constitutional framework is solidifying? If so, what kinds of support would you recommend?

3. What role, if any, should civil society and/or the media have in the overall framework of civil-military relations in the country?

In addition, the committee has been invited to make recommendations regarding strategies for maintaining civilian control of the military (i.e., coup prevention) and extending democratic (i.e., diffuse and institutionalized) control of the military.

This topic will be addressed in the context of how the U.S. gorvernment addresses civil-military relations. It is not to suggest that this is the only way, nor that other countries and governments do as the U.S. does. However, this approach intends to provide an explanation of U.S. measures for conducting civilian control of the military as an example, to be used as a point of departure for furthering discussions in the seminar.

Objective: The purpose of this section is to discuss the development of roles and missions as a process under the U.S. Constitution, legislation, and policy. In doing this, the framework discussed in the previous session will expand to include functions at the political, policy and operational levels which form roles and missions. Ultimately, both the Executive and Legislative branches of government operate best when working toward identified national interests which inform a coordinated national security strategy.

I. Introduction.
The process of forming military roles and missions occurs under the mandate of several federal documents, which issue directives, assign responsibilities, and provide authorizations to the military. In the most general terms, the American people mandate in the Preamble of the Constitution a requirement to "provide for the common defense," and in Article I, Section 8, and Article II, Section 2, outline Congressional and Executive responsibilities. Roles and missions, however, must be a product with which the military can function at the operational level. Implementation of Constitutional mandates and assignment of these responsibilities must be done in a dynamic environment where both the Executive and Legislative branches of government can incorporate changes in available resources and threats. The process should be able to adopt advances in technology, and various economic conditions, while adapting to changes in the security environment, all within the overall scope of national interests.

II. Thesis. Both the Executive and Legislative branches have responsibilities in forming roles and missions for the military. The U.S. system of doing this is through Executive directives and instructions, and the Legislative process of passing authorizations, appropriations, and policies into law. The products of these efforts formulate security policy to secure and advance national interests. Under this level of political activity, the Executive branch and most intensely the Secretary of Defense provides civilian oversight of the military through policymaking, which directs military activities (operational level).

The Corporate Analogy:
The U.S. chief executive officer is the President of the United States and
Commander-in-Chief He, along with the Secretaries of State and Defense, and
the National Security Advisor, determine the security needs of the nation, and
then take measures to ensure that they are met. The President, in his constitutional role as commander-in-chief of the armed forces, is the senior authority in the U.S. and as such is ultimately responsible for the protection of the United States from all enemies, foreign and domestic.

The U.S. Congress
As part of the Constitution's system of checks and balances, the U.S. budget must be approved by the Congress, which acts as the nation's board of directors. Coordination with the Congress is accomplish through various committees of both houses, primarily those dealing with funding, military operations and intelligence. Their decisions affect military well being and range from setting civilian and military pay scales, to funding major troop deployments and supporting the military with resources to maintain readiness.

The American People
If the President is the CEO and Congress is the Board of Directors, then the stockholders are the American people. In the U.S. nearly everyone has had a family member or friend who was -- or continues -- to work for the Department of Defense. The Department of Defense exists to protect these citizen stockholders. Without their support the Department of Defense would go out of business.

III. National Security Policymaking
The Logic:
Nations have national interests which require protection and governments hope to advance. While the scope of national interests may be wide, policymakers are forced, at a minimum, to identify broad national interests. Based upon coordinated and broadly agreed areas of national interests, the executive branch forms a national security strategy which ALL executive departments have varying degrees have responsibility; the bulk of this work is done by the National Security Council, Department of State, and Department of Defense. The Department of Defense forms a defense strategy in support of the national security strategy. Likewise other departments develop their strategies to support the overall national security strategy centering on their functional interests.

the Practice: Recognizing the directives and responsibilities outlined in broad mandates (constitution, and defense legislation such as Title X), a national security strategy must begin to take shape. Arriving at mutually agreed national interests even in the broadest terms is very difficult. However, without this basis forming security policy lacks sound direction. The easiest areas of mutual agreement are broad topics, such as: continued economic growth, defense of the nation's territorial integrity, advancement of democracy. But even these areas will encounter debate when discussion includes the pace and means of growth, level of budgetary commitment to defend the nation, or the priority with which democracy should have in allocating resources particularly in the case of forwarding democracy in foreign lands.
In the Department of Defense, the two broadest areas of defense policymaking are contingency planning and defense planning. While both areas are highly classified, policymakers realize that informing the legislators to some level is crucial to gaining Congressionally allocated resources. A balance must be struck between secrecy and coordination to gain the support of legislators for public authority and Congressional resources, while lawmakers must realize the importance of confidentiality of operational plans, and broader areas of defense planning.

Based upon a defense strategy and contingency plans which support an overall national security strategy, roles and missions begin to take more specific shape.

IV. Distinctions between Roles and Missions
Enduring purpose for which an organization is established.

Functions: The appropriate or assigned duties, responsibilities, missions, or tasks of an individual, office, or organization. As defined in the National Security Act
of 1947, as amended, the term "function" includes functions, powers, and duties (5 United States Code 171n (a)).

1. The task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken.
2. In common usage, especially when applied to lower military units, a duty assigned to an individual or unit; a task. It includes the who, what, when, and where aspects of a specific action to be taken.

V. Political Directives
U.S. Code, Title ]O
Identifies service component functions, manning, equipping, and assigns responsibilities to individuals within the Department of Defense.
Other legislation:
Policy and investigative legislation
Appropriations - Provides budgetary allocations

National Security Strategy
Outlines National Interest
Security Strategy

VI. Defense Policy Directives
Quadrennial Defense Review - Congressionally Mandated Unclassified
Defense Posture Statement
Defense Planning Guidance - Classified Document Provides Long Range
Perspectives of Security Environment
Defense Strategy
Regional Applications of Strategy
Procurement Guidance Contingency Planning Guidance - Classified Document

VII. Operational Implementation
Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan - Classified Documents Contingency Mans - Classified Documents

The purpose of this period is to discuss aspects of military professionalism in a democracy.

I. What is a Profession?
A. "A peculiar type of functional group with highly specialized characteristics.." Sam Huntington
B. Attributes of a profession.
1. Expertise.
a. Specialized knowledge and skill in a significant field of human endeavor.
b. Acquired by prolonged education and experience.
c. Standards of professional competence.
2. Responsibility.
a. Performs a service essential to the client - society.
b. Financial remuneration hot the primary aim of the profession.
c. Written or unwritten norms/ethics transmitted through the
profession's education system --not imposed from outside.
3. Corporateness.
a. Members share a sense of unity and consciousness as a group apart from laymen.
b. Derives from discipline and training required to achieve competence.
c. Along with Expertise and Responsibility, distinguishes the professional from the layman.

II. Military professionalism.
A. Expertise. Much like any other profession except .
1. Central skill of the military is Harold Laswell's "management of violence."
2. The direction, operation and control of an organization whose primary function is the application of violence is the unique skill of the officer.
3. Requires considerable training and experience.
a. Complex, intellectual skill
b. One third of modern officer's professional life devoted to formal schooling.
4. The peculiar skill of the military officer is universal.
a. Same standards apply in USA, Russia, and Africa.
b. Common professional skill is a bond among officers.
5. General education also an essential qualification - especially today.
B. Responsibility.
1. Improper use of expertise can wreck the fabric of society.
2. Society (civilian control) insists that the management of violence be utilized only for socially (politically) approved purposes. What if it is not?
3. The military profession can have but one client - the state/civil society,
which has a monopoly on the military profession.
a. Identify security needs of the state.
b. Advise how to meet those needs.
c. Help implement.
4. What if the military monopolizes the state?
5. The military oft4cer is motivated by a technical love of his craft and the sense of social obligation to use his skills for the benefit of society as defined by his civilian superiors.
6. Society (civilian superiors) assures the military's correct motivation by reasonable remuneration and respect.
C. Corporate Character. The right to practice profession is limited to a carefully
defined body.
1. Commission is license.
2. Rank permits performance of certain duties and functions.
3. Officer eligibility derives from rank.
D. Military Professionalism embraces the commitment to civilian control.
E. Integrity.
1. The key.
2. "Higher calling" equates to higher standards of conduct/behavior.
3. Civilian perceptions of the military.
a. Required for national defense.
b. Cautious about motivation/ambition.
c. Not relevant to society when no external threat is perceived.
4. Onus is on the military to shape perception, remain relevant.

III. Conclusion.

A. Civilian control of the military is an indispensable aspect of the democratic process that the military seeks to preserve.
B. Civilian control of the military is not self-implementing. It must be taught and reinforced.

To discuss the relationship between the Executive and Legislative branches (horizontal coordination) of government in the context of maintaining an effective defense establishment. This dialogue is critical to gaining public support, legitimacy, and resources for the military.

I.Introduction. The
roles of the congress and executive branches should now be clear in the context of civil-military relations. Fundamentally, the president's role as Commander-in-Chief makes the President the individual ultimately responsible for executive implementation, while congressional authority is in allocating fiscal resources. This relationship is cyclical and never-ending. The corporate analogy of the President being the Chief Executive Officer; the Congress a Board of Directors; and the people, their shareholders puts into context the importance of maintaining public support for military activities.

II. Thesis. The dialogue between the Executive and Legislative branches of government is essential for the nation to have an effective defense establishment that enjoys broad public support. An effective military establishment must pay its service members at an appropriate rate, fund research and development, procure equipment, and have public support when the Commander-in-Chief must use force. Lacking public support undermines the roles, functions and missions of the military.

III. Dialogue: Exchange Views, Coordinate, and Gain Support
Why talk with the Congress?
The cyclical nature of security strategy development, the budget process, and legislative authorizations require continuous dialogue between the legislative and executive branches.

What is there to achieve? (What is at stake?)
Credibility and Responsibility
Exchange perspectives of the security situation (strategy)
Common ground on what needs to be done (requirements)
Congressional funding (budget)
Public and congressional support for military deployment (missions)

Credibility and Responsibility
Exchange perspectives of the security situation (strategy)
Common ground on what needs to be done (requirements)
Oversight of the Executive
Allocate resources responsibly
Gain/build public support

The small Group will have from 1300-1520 to work on this task. The results of the effort will be presented to the plenary session from 1530-1630 on the same day.

Objective: The purpose of this session is to address tasks and to develop an effective framework for coordination between the Parliament and the military.

Discussion: During the past day-and-a-half, we have discussed several areas of civil-military relations in the context of security policymaking. Some of the tasks involved in defense policymaking include formation of national interests, creation of a national security strategy, and development of defense strategy. Within defense strategy there are several areas of policymaking inherently required: force structure development, defense research and development, procurement of new equipment, training programs to maintain readiness, and budget formulation.

Tasks: Identify for presentation to the plenary session areas listed below. Include various levels of the defense organization (civilian and military) and the Parliament that includes executive to legislative coordination from staff levels to the Minister and Parliamentary Members.

Vignette 1:
- What are the broad areas that comprise defense strategy and policymaking?

- Present a framework within which Defense and the Parliament can use to coordinate information. This framework should include:

Various areas of defense that relate to gain public support,

Various areas that may require legislative action (appropriation, legislation of laws and directives for study).

A schedule, particularly of areas requiring routine coordination and debate such as appropriations.

Vignette 2.
Develop a schedule for coordinating a one-year defense budget between the executive and legislative branches. Include ways to grapple the several areas of defense policy for budgeting to include: training, procurement, civilian and military pay, operations and maintenance costs, installations and facilities, military construction, etc. How can this coordination be done given classified information for defense strategy?

I. Objective:
To develop and discuss the requirements and methods of defense restructuring as a continuous civil-military process.

II. Introduction. No defense establishment is exactly the right size. This is because requirements for defense change all the time - sometimes very quickly
- with new threats, new technologies, and new policies.

A. Downsizing (disappearance of old threats, lack of funds)
B. Force-building (appearance of new threats, surplus of funds)
C. Right-sizing (the balance)

III. Planning the Force. One of the major challenges for any government is to articipate future needs for defense, while satisfying current needs. The restructuring of defense requires a process for managing the complex and interdependent defense 'systems'. 'Zero-Based' planning requires a 'Net Assessment' of capabilities and risks.

A. Principles (values and interests)
B. Policies (realism versus idealism)
C. Strategies (threat-based versus capabilities-based versus politically
D. Planning (centralized versus decentralized)
E. Execution (centralized versus decentralized)

IV. The Hierarchy of Strategic Plans.
A. National Security Strategy

1) Incorporates all aspects of the government's security function (law
enforcement, civil defense, economic, military, diplomatic, social,
2) Signed by President

B. Roles for the Armed Forces

1) Part of the National Security Strategy.
2) Until civilian leaders decide on roles of military forces, they cannot
make decisions regarding the size and shape of the defense establishment.
C. National Military Strategy

1) The military component of the National Security Strategy.
2) Describes mission profiles (ends, ways, and means)
3) Signed by Minister of Defense

V. Determining Force Structure. What types of armed forces (and how' many) are needed to execute the strategy?
A. Land Forces
B. Maritime Forces
C. Air Forces
D. Special Operations Forces
E. Peacekeeping Forces
F. Constabulary Forces
G. Reserve Forces (AC/RC mix)

VI. The 'Systems Approach' to Force Structure Support.
1) Equipment (weapons, spare parts, transportation, man-portable)
2) Personnel (recruiting, training, education, manning levels)
3) Basing (functions, locations, numbers, economic effects)

VII. Paying for the Force.
A. Transition from Planning to Programming

1) Plans are worst-case scenarios
2) Programs are resource-constrained
3) Prioritization needed
4) Harmonizing and Optimizing

B. Transition from Programming to Budgeting
1) Paying real money for real capabilities
2) Interagency competition
3) Making tradeoffs

VIII. Deciding When to Restructure.
The restart of the cycle - or the validation of what has just been accomplished.
A. External threat changes
B. Internal threat changes
C. Shortage of funding
D. Political commitments (PSO, for example)
E. New government (new priorities)
F. Periodic Reviews ('Quadrennial Defense Review' in U.S.)

lx. Deciding What to Change. All elements are inter-dependent. Systems (and programs) are interlocking and mutually supporting. Change one and the rest must be affected in some way (Carriers and Planes).

A. National Security Strategy
B. National Military Strategy
C. Roles and Missions of the Aimed Forces
D. Force structure
E. Acquisition system
F. Personnel system
G. Basing system

X. Pitfalls and Challenges of Defense Restructuring.
A. Civil-Military Relations
B. Consequences of getting it wrong
C. Politics of defense funding (representative government)
D. Change for the sake of change (or, NOT changing because of 'tradition')
F. Measures of Effectiveness (benefits and consequences)

XI. Conclusion. The restructuring of a defense establishment is a political process, involving all government organizations. civilian and military. Citizens depend on governments to protect them. Governments must decide how best to do that with the limited resources available to them.

This topic will be addressed in the context of how the U.S. government addresses civil-military relations. It is not to suggest that this is the only way, nor that other countries and governments do as the U.S. does. However, this approach intends to provide an explanation of U.S. measures for conducting civilian control of the military as an example, to be used as a point of departure for furthering discussions in the seminar.

Objective: The purpose of this section is to discuss development of force structure in the context of the civil-military framework, focusing on the internal Department of Defense process. This session with discuss force structure as a subordinate element of the National Security Strategy, which identifies national interests, the security environment; and the Defense Strategy which outlines capability requirements based on the need to respond to the full spectrum of contingencies. This is done while abiding by the legislative directives to, and responsibilities of, the defense establishment. This session will focus on the relationship between the Secretary of Defense and service components as a cyclical process of directives, development, and review.

While the Constitution and Congress provide several constraints and responsibilities to the defense establishment, they, with the National Command Authorities also provide guidance, authority and funding. Within this civil-military framework the Department of Defense and service components form their military organizations and force structure. Although closely associated, and often linked, there are two lines of responsibilities within the Department of Defense civil-military structure with distinct responsibilities, both of which are headed by the Secretary of Defense. The military service departments are responsible for administrative areas, typically referred to as equipping, manning and training the force. The Secretary of Defense, with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and subordinate commanders-in-chief are responsible for operational aspects of the military.

II. Thesis. The dialogue between the Executive; and Legislative branches of government is essential for a nation to have an effective defense establishment that operates with broad public support. An effective military establishment must have a force structure that supports the national security and defense strategies. The executive branch based upon identified national interests, threats, and its national security strategy develops a defense strategy. The legislative branch provides the venue for public debate and appropriates funds for the force based upon intensive coordination. The civil-military work to develop force structures occurs intensively within the Department of Defense and is a cyclical process of civilian guidance, military development of force structures, and review by civilian authorities.
Force structure drives much of the budgeting process. It will determine the number of forces, weapons procurement, and operations and maintenance costs. Defense strategy formed by the Department of Defense outlines the requirements and should provide some rationale for the force requirement. Threats, roles and missions, and how forces are to be used should be components of the defense strategy which provide a rationale for the force structure.

III. Dialogue: Exchange Views, Coordinate, and Gain Support
Broadly speaking, there are two lines of coordination in developing force structures: Executive and Legislative (horizontal) and within the Executive branch of government, civilian and military (vertical).

Horizontal Coordination: Key for political and fiscal support
Vertical Coordination: Key for reaching coordinated security policy.

IV. Vertical Coordination
Cyclical process: Guidance-Development-Review Defense Planning Guidance
Strategy: Defense component of the NSS
Requirements: What we need to do
Plans: Specific Instructions
The 2000 DPG issued early spring addresses 02-07
Budget: Program Objective Memorandum Process Budget submissions to Congress (Jan)
Force Structure developed by Military, Reviewed by Secretary of Defense, then President, and the legislative branch.

The purpose of this period is to discuss aspects of the development of a Life Skills Program in the armed forces.

A. Introduction & Background
A. Department of Defense/South Africa National Defense Forces requirement to rationalize/down-size/right-size the SANDF.
B. Distinguished Visitor Orientation Tour (DVOT) to the US in December 2000.
1. Deputy Minister of Defense led delegation of DOD/SANDF, DOL and members of Parliament.
2. Visited US military facilities in Colorado, Illinois and Washington, DC.
3. Impressed by the Life Skills Program at Great Lakes Naval Training Center outside of Chicago.
C. Life Skills Development Program Conducted at the Center for Advanced Training (CAT) late March 2001.
1. Approximately 90 participants from a variety of sectors of South African society participated.
2. Action Plan developed.

II. Great Lakes Naval Training Center
A. Goals of the Navy Program. Produce military personnel who are, from the beginning of their time on active duty, educated, trained and equipped with the skills necessary to be productive in the service, easy to transition from the service and finally, productive in civilian life after military service.
B. Organization. Must have commands/organizations responsible for both basic
military training as well as remedial education and basic civilian skill
development. Organizations must be linked and cooperate fully.
1. Screening of new personnel.
2. Instill discipline, but show concern.
3. Motivate, build loyalty.

III. Program Issues
A. Determine rights and entitlements.
1 What benefits do we want our service members and families to have?
a. Pay
b. Education
C. Health
4. Housing
e. Moving
f. Retirement
g. Post separation
2. What legislation is required?
B. Authorization and Funding.
C. Components.
1. Entry level education & training.
a. Remedial education.
b. Military skill development.
2. Active duty programs.
a. Continuing Education -- University, Technical.
b. On duty versus off duty.
c. Tuition assistance.
4. Officer training/development.
3. Transition programs.
a. Prepare service member for productive civilian life.
b. Ensure talents and abilities are not lost.
c. Develop cooperation between government and public/private employers.
4. May require legislation to ensure equal employment opportunities.
4. Post release programs.
a. Retirement
b. Education benefits.
c. Employment preference.
4. Home loan guarantees.
e. Medical care.
f. Vocational rehabilitation.
g. Burial/Cemeteries/Headstones.
D. Partnerships with Civil Society
1. Veterans Organizations.
9 Private companies.

IV. Summary
The President has directed that the SANDF be rationalized to its optimum size by the end of 2003. A Select Committee, consisting of members of Parliament, Veterans Organizations, Department of Labor and members of the SANDF, has been formed to discuss the development and implementation of a program that will transition SANDF members to productive roles in civil society. Beyond the difficult question of transition, the committee has also been tasked to address the broader issue of life skills and education of SANDF members.

You are that Select Committee. You have been working on this issue for the past three months and have been asked by Cabinet to present a briefing on the program that you are developing. That briefing will take place in two hours time.

Present your plan for a program of life skill development in the SANDF.

This topic will be addressed in the context of how the U.S. government addresses civil-military relations. It is not to suggest that this is the only way, nor that other countries and governments do as the U.S. does. However, this approach intends to provide an explanation of U.S. measures for conducting civilian control of the military as an example, to be used as a point of departure for furthering discussions in the seminar.

The purpose of this session is to discuss concepts of base closures and realignment as forces structures are reduced, and the ramifications of these adjustments to state, city, and local economies. Obviously political ramifications can be severe, however, a strategic view should not be lost in this effort. This session is not intended to provide U.S. history in the context of BRAC, nor to compare the economic magnitude with other economies. There are, however, similar dynamics, factors and relationships in this kind action and discussion of these areas may prove helpful to democratic governments undergoing these types of reductions.

Objective: To identify interests and rationale for base closures and realignment from the perspectives of the executive, particularly defense and armed forces perspective, as well as those of the Congress (Parliament), states, cities, and local communities. This session will also address lessons learned from the U.S. BRAC experience from 1989 that may be applicable to other governments undergoing similar adjustments.

I. Background. The executive, specifically the Department of Defense, should present the concept of base closures and realignment (BRAC) founded on its defense strategy and its experience of using the base. The US national security and defense strategies changed following the fall of the Soviet Union and end of the cold war. Forces were reduced and likewise the requirement to maintain facility levels exceeded needs. The excess translated into defense budget burdens, leading to a move to reduce bases.

Factors. The tension for and against base closures focus on reductions to reduce defense burdens, and on the part of the Congress, states and local communities keeping bases operating since they are key components of local economies. Congress created the BRAC process, which works as follows: DoD carefully evaluates and ranks each base according to a published plan for the size of future military forces and to published criteria.

The criteria include:
a. Military value
b. Return on investment
c. Environmental impact
4. Economic impact on the surrounding communities
Upon formal decision to close or realign a base, the scheme which follows is organization (of local and federal interests), coordination (for transition), and implementation.

III. Improving Efficiencies. Lessons learned and a new approach in 1993 pointed at the executive branch taking a more active role in closures and transitions of local economies away from military base economies. This new approach accelerated local economy transitions to more stable, and in many cases stronger, economies. The lessons learned focused on the executive role to accelerate not only base closures, but also the transitions to follow. By forming priorities and applying resources to accelerate breaching obstacles, the economic transition from those founded on military presence, to alternative economies occurred more rapidly. Related to this, the faster the transition occurred, the better the local economy AND the Department of Defense were served. The new approach included:

a. Property' disposal that puts local economic redevelopment first. Job creation took highest priority. Interim leases for facilities have been encouraged, and approval for leasing has been delegated to lower organizational levels. Federal screening for reuse of facilities and equipment has been expedited. DoD consultations with local communities before removing personal property from a closing base.

h. Fast-track enviromental cleanup to remove needless delays. Base cleanup teams of experts from DoD, Environmental Protection Agency and state representatives established at all closing or realigning installations where property is available for transfer. Objective is for these teams to make decisions to accelerate cleanup.

C. Transition coordinators. Assigned to each closing base to ensure tat communities and other interested parties have the information as needed. Base transition coordinators have access to all parts of DoD, the base commander, and other federal and state agencies.

d. More effective economic developmentt assistance. Provides financial and technical assistance from DoD and Department of Commerce, and the Department of Labor. Also accelerated the process to obtain this assistance.

References for additional information
"Closing Bases Though but Necessary", Joshua Gotbaum, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Economic Security. Statement to the Military Installations and Facilities Subcommittee, House National Security Committee, February 23, 1995.

"Economic Renewal: Community Reuse of Former Military Bases" April 21, 1999.

'The Report of the Department of Defense on Base Realignment and Closure" httn://

"The Report of the Department of Defense on Base Realignment and Closure", Required by Section 2824 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2998, Public Law 105-85. April 1998

Environmental BRAC Home Page

I. The scope of the AIDS pandemic in Africa
A. A Continent in Peril
1. 17 million Africans have already died of AIDS, 2.4 million in the year 2000 alone
2. 25.3 million Africans are living with HIV/AIDS, 3.8 million new infections last year
3. Average adult infection rate of 8.8%
B. Sub Saharan Africa
1. Regardless of whether one agrees with the UN statistics, the subcontinent is in a dire condition.
2. Countries with the worst problems are just beginning to seriously come to terms with the pandemic.
II. HIV/AIDS and the Armed Forces
A. Changing nature of the threat to national security
1. Traditional military threat (invasion)
2. Today threats are rooted in political, economic, societal, and environmental considerations - crime, terrorism, arms trafficking, environmental degradation, and disease
B. HIV/AIDS is more destabilizing than wars currently raging
1. Ten times more people dying from AIDS than from war
2. Weakens the state's ability to stabilize, defend, or protect itself
3. Will cause social and political unrest, and potentially even war
C. Armed Forces are in the middle of the pandemic
1. At high risk of infection and transmission
a. Nature of work (risk takers), age group, deployment, exposure to commercial sex workers
b. Infection rates two to three times the national average
2. Often first called upon to prevent or attend to the crises HIV/AIDS causes
3. Produces numerous civil-military relations concerns
D. HIV/AIDS affects aimed forces ability to perform its missions
1. Loss of continuity at command level
2. Rapid promotion of younger, less experience and trained personnel
3. Hollowing out of an already weak organization
4. Reduced military preparedness, internal stability, and external security

III. HIV/AIDS a National Health Emergency and a National Security Threat
-Presenting Challenges and Opportunities in Civil-Military Relations
A. High infection rate among armed forces constitutes a weakness which the military would prefer not to have exposed to potential enemies, but the armed forces is a significant mechanism of transmission of HIV within society at large - How should this dilemma be resolved?
B. AIDS control strategies within the armed forces may raise human rights issues (e.g., mandatory testing) - How should these issues be addressed?
C. Greater intersectoral collaboration that moves beyond traditional ministerial divisions and distinctions between the roles of private and public, or civil and military can allow for the aggregation of scare organization capacity to promote common welfare, however, civil-military relations issues are likely to arise
D. Armed forces can be a mechanism of transmission - of solutions
1. With their regularized channels of internal and international communication, and relatively sophisticated health care and command systems, militaries may be ideally positioned to interact with each other and jointly to devise risk reduction initiatives that can serve as models for societies at large
2. Employing soldiers in community peer-education roles may be an appropriate response to this new national security threat and this may raise new civil-military relations issues
3. This type of military/civilian support at the local level (already ongoing in disaster and development support) may serve to improve the status of the military in society and improve civil-military relations

IV. Common Features of Effective National Responses (UNAIDS)
A. Political will and leadership
B. Societal openness and determination to fight against stigma
C. A Strategic Response
D. Multisectoral and multilevel action
E. Community-based responses
F. Social policy reform to reduce vulnerability
G. Longer-term and sustained response
H. Learning from experience
I. Adequate resources

Your task in this last exercise is to sketch a multisectoral AIDS Control strategy.
1. What are the most important elements of such a strategy?
2. How, if at all, will the civilian and military component differ?
3. What will the roles of government, non-governmental organizations, the media, and the armed forces be in implementing this strategy?
4. How should national actors coordinate with each other?
5. What are the most challenging obstacles to success likely to be?
6. How will these be addressed?
7. What effect, if any, is implementation of this strategy likely to have on civil-military relations?

The purpose of this period is to develop an plan of action to guide interaction between the Parliament and the Department of Defense and the SANDF.

I. Introduction.

A. The most important phase of this seminar begins when we all walk out the door this afternoon.
B. An action plan that outlines specific actions to be taken in the short, mid and long terms, will improve the likelihood that substantive changes/improvements in interaction between the two groups will be implemented.

II. Task.
A. Develop an action plan that address short (< six months), mid term (<one year) and long term (beyond one year) actions that can be taken to improve effective communication and cooperation between the Parliament and the DoD/SANDF.
B. Assign responsibilities for follow up to specific individuals.
C. Set up a schedule to monitor implementation of the plan.
D. Present your plan.


The purpose of this period is to close the course and present certificates to participants.


I. Closing Comments.
A. Seminar Leader.
B. American Chief of Mission or representative.
C. Representative of Parliament or South African Government.

II. Presentation of Certificates.

III. Conclusion.