Department of Defence Human Resource Strategy 2010: Edition 2


Since the establishment of the Department of Defence (DOD) and the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) on 27 April 1994, a corporate transformation process has been underway to migrate from the pre-1994 defence dispensation to a new dispensation as envisaged by the Constitution, the White Paper on Defence and the Defence Review. Since then, much progress has been made on many fronts and the DOD / SANDF is organisationally and otherwise, vastly different compared to the situation of only a few years ago.

The majority of the change imperatives identified in the Constitution, the White Paper on Defence and the Defence Review have a direct or indirect influence on the DODís human resource (HR) environment. Many of the changes already implemented, specifically within the HR environment, were the result of the negotiated settlement rather than the outcome of a co-ordinated and planned strategy. Many changes have been beneficial and have significantly contributed towards transformation, for example the definite progress towards representivity. However, many changes have also had side effects that impact negatively on the readiness, output and efficiency of the SANDF. Some of the primary negative effects, in no particular order of importance, include the ineffective implementation of the current service system that has led to the ageing and stagnation of large numbers of members especially at lower rank-levels, low morale and loss of expertise, perceptions of a lack of discipline, a lack of rejuvenation of the SANDFís human resource composition, a lack of enabling mechanisms to facilitate a constant throughput of members, deteriorating health status and representivity imbalances at certain levels and in certain musterings.

The development of a coherent HR strategy to give direction to the management of the DODís HR over the medium to long term (ie over the next ten years) is hampered by uncertainty regarding the nature, appropriateness and affordability of the developing force design, force structure and establishment table. The DODís HR strategy should ideally be informed by a relatively stable force design, force structure and establishment table.

Critical decisions and action to provide strategic HR direction can, however, not wait until definitive decisions are reached on steady end-state issues such as the force design and force structure. The DOD requires a coherent HR strategy now to


AOT : Administrative, Operational and Technical

CHA : Concurrent Health Assessment

CSS : Core Service System

DOD : Department of Defence

D Pers Acq : Directorate Personnel Acquisition

ETD : Education, Training and Development

EIP : Employer Initiated Package

FTC : Full-Time Component

FSS : Flexible Service System

HR : Human Resource

IMS : Initial Military Service

JSCSP : Joint Senior Command and Staff Program

LTS : Long Term Service

MTS : Medium Term Service

MSD : Military Skills Development System

NCO : Non Commissioned Officer

PSAP : Public Service Act Personnel

PDSC : Plenary Defence Staff Council

RPP : Rural Protection Plan

RegF : Regular Force

ResF : Reserve Forces

ROTC : Reserve Officers Training Corps

RDP : Reconstruction and Development Program

SANDF : South African National Defence Force

STS : Short Term Service

SDP : Strategic Defence Package

SADF : South African Defence Force

SA Army : South African Army

SAMHS : South African Military Health Service

SAAF : South African Airforce

SAPS : South African Police Service

SAQA : South African Qualifications Authority

SCS : Senior Career System

SAN : South African Navy

VSP : Voluntary Severance Package

YFTP : Youth Foundation Training Program


Col/Capt (SAN) : Colonel/Captain (SAN)

Lt Col/Cdr (SAN) : Lieutenant Colonel/Commander (SAN)

Maj/Lt Cmdr (SAN) : Major/Lieutenant Commander (SAN)

Capt/Lt (SAN) : Captain/Lieutenant (SAN)

Lt/S Lt (SAN) : Lieutenant/Sub-Lieutenant (SAN)

2Lt/Esn (SAN) : Second Lieutenant/Ensign (SAN)

WO 1 : Warrant Officer Class 1

WO 2 : Warrant Officer Class 2

S Sgt/F Sgt (SAAF)/CPO (SAN) : Staff Sergeant/Flight Sergeant (SAAF)/Chief

Petty Officer (SAN)

Sgt/PO (SAN) : Sergeant/Petty Officer (SAN)

Cpl/L Smn (SAN) : Corporal/Leading Seaman (SAN)

L Cpl/AB (SAN) : Lance Corporal/Able Seaman (SAN)

Pte/Sea (SAN)/Amn (SAAF) : Private/Seaman (SAN)/Airman (SAAF)



It is intended that this HR strategy should


The aim of the DOD HR Strategy 2010 is to ensure the establishment of the most effective, efficient and economic Defence HR composition, of the right quantity and quality in the right places at the right times.


The aim introduces the following "first principles" upon which this strategy is founded:


The terminology used in this document is mostly self-explanatory. The following terms with their meanings are, however, provided to clarify specific concepts:


The methodology adopted is that this strategy should not have a predominantly theoretical focus. The strategy has been informed by studying international best practice defence HR management models, such as that of Germany and the United Kingdom. It is, however, based upon a practical analysis of the current DOD HR context and realities as well as the provisioning of strategic direction based upon appropriate solutions for the unique situation of the DOD, to guide HR management over the next ten years. The focus is on the predominant systems, processes and issues which drive, or significantly influence, the "provide HR process", from a strategic perspective.

The strategy itself is based on the premise that it must provide solutions to solve the main HR problem areas which, if not addressed, will lead to the deterioration of the DODís HR composition and thereby the inability of the DOD to execute its mission. The strategy is configured ito a metaphorical "cap stand" with "hooks" that should make provision for the development of departmental and Administrative, Operational and Technical (AOT) policies, as well as sub-strategies, to give effect to the macro-direction provided by HR Strategy 2010.

Use is made of, among other sources, documents which have already been approved by the Plenary Defence Staff Council (PDSC) in the recent past, as well as relevant statistics, where appropriate.



Ito the Constitution, the main function of the SANDF is the defence of the RSA against any external aggressor. Various secondary functions are also mandated. In reality the RSA faces no external military threat and the SANDF is largely involved with secondary functions, which have, in fact become the primary task. The dichotomy facing defence planners is to what extent limited resources should be directed towards maintaining the capability to execute the primary function versus the necessity to execute secondary functions or ordered commitments. Differing prioritisation viewpoints within the DOD continue to result in efforts to maintain extensive capabilities in both areas, with the resulting decline in output in both areas. The above dichotomy also has a direct bearing on strategic perceptions regarding the DODís "provide HR process", as well as the implementation thereof.

This review comprises an analysis of the primary factors which currently determine, or significantly impact on, the "provide HR process" within the DOD.


Impact of Force Design Imperatives. The force design proposed in the Defence Review is clearly not affordable, given the budget allocation to Defence. The force levels proposed therein are based on linear projections derived from the budget allocation, rather than from any proposed design. It has therefore been impossible to bring the proposed force design and the budget allocation together in planning considerations, and the DOD has still not been able to finalise a force design and structure after seven years of transformation. The risks pertaining to the non-finalisation of the force design and structure to achieve a relatively steady end-state, have wide-ranging ramifications in the HR environment. Some of the risks pertaining to the HR environment, in particular, are the following:

Affordability of HR. The White Paper on Defence, Chapter 5, states that "for political, strategic and economic reasons, the SANDF will be an all-volunteer force. It will comprise a relatively small RegF, including a civilian component, which is backed up by a sufficiently large Part Time Force." It is further stated that "a basic structure of this nature is extremely cost effective and allows for flexibility in force levels according to the internal and external security environment." The Defence Review, Chapter 10, par 39.4 states that "a suggested target is that personnel, operating costs and capital renewal could each receive approximately 40%, 30% and 30% representivity of the total appropriation." It is further stated in par 39.5 that "Ö in terms of the present budget allocation and the average personnel cost per individual, a figure of approximately 70 000 is considered a viable Full-Time personnel componentÖ"

The reality is that, since the promulgation of the Defence Review, the DOD has not, and could not, succeed in approaching the suggested 40% target (in real terms) on personnel expenditure. Although the Personnel budget for the year 2001/02 comprises only 39% of the total defence budget, this is a distorted representation as it is compared to a total budget which includes RM5 597 for the strategic defence packages (SDP). When discounting the SDP allocation, the Personnel budget still amounts to 53% of the defence budget, which severely constrains the amount left for the operating budget, thereby seriously impairing defence outputs.

The major reason why personnel expenditure cannot be curtailed is to be found in the SANDFís macro-composition. The SANDF has not given effect to the White Paper and Defence Review provisions that it should comprise a "relatively small RegF, including a civilian component, which is backed up by a sufficiently large Reserve Force (ResF)." Due recognition is given to the fact that it is not feasible to substantially downscale the RegF without suitable personnel redeployment and re-employment enabling mechanisms being in place. Substantial downscaling also entails risks and the ResF is, as a result of prolonged underfunding, currently not in a position to take up the slack resulting from a substantially downscaled RegF. Cognisance must therefore be taken that the Defence Review target of 40% personnel expenditure, if still regarded as an imperative, can only be attained over the long term, once suitable redeployment mechanisms are institutionalised as part of the way that personnel serve in the RegF, and once the ResF has been sufficiently funded to enable it to assume a bigger segment of the defence burden.

One Force Model. The White Paper on Defence, Chapter 5, page 22 and the Defence Review, Chapter 3, par 9.6, page 12, state that the SANDF will consist of a "relatively small" RegF and a "sufficiently largeí" ResF. To date, however, nothing has materialised in planning considerations to give effect to this intention. The chief reason for proclaiming the One Force Model, namely to have a sufficiently large defence capability at a much more affordable cost, has therefore not materialised. Due to the lack of an integrated planning process to synergise the potential contribution of the Reserve Force with that of the Regular Force as well as under-funding of the Reserve Force, leading to a lack of its capacity building in the form of sufficient training and utilisation, the inherent benefits of increased Reserve Force utilisation have not been optimised. Differing viewpoints exist within the DOD as to the role of the ResF, for example whether it is to be an integral part of the SANDFís force design or whether it is to be regarded purely as a wartime reserve. If the latter view prevails, the intentions of the White Paper on Defence and the Defence Review cannot be met. All indications are, judging from both the current and proposed force design and structure, that the ResF is not being planned for and a strategic decision in this regard, which should be incorporated in the Military Strategy, is now a matter of urgency. The risk in not taking such a strategic decision is that the FTC personnel budget will continue to consume more than one half of the total Defence budget, with the result that Defence outputs will continue to decline. There is also the additional risk that, should the ResF continue to be starved of resources, its capacity and will to regenerate and be a viable component of the SANDF may be lost.


The notion of the "One Force Model", as spelled out in the White Paper on Defence and the Defence Review, has created an opportunity for closer synergy between the RegF and the ResF, which could result in significant savings on personnel and more funds for the DODís operating budget.

The undefined and unquantified state of exactly what is meant by the terms "relatively small" RegF and "sufficiently large" ResF, as well as the undefined extent of integration required between the RegF and ResF ito the "One Force Model", inhibit effective strategic planning.

The prolonged under-funding of both ResF components (Territorial Reserve and Conventional Reserve) endangers the operational efficiency and utility of these components and by implication the operational efficiency of the SANDF as a whole, which may lead to a loss of capacity to regenerate the ResF as a viable component of the SANDF.

The lack of implementation guidelines for the ResFís contribution in support of the force design, as well as uncertainty regarding the ResFís force structure and role, leads to force development (including force preparation and force structuring), prioritisation and resource allocation not making appropriate provision for the ResF.

The imbalance in resource allocation will expedite the deterioration of ResF capabilities at a time when the SANDF relies heavily on the ResF, especially the Territorial Reserves, for internal deployments such as border-line control and cooperation with the SAPS. (It should be noted that the Territorial Reserve, which is in fact the primary driver and actor in the Rural Protection Plan (RPP) owing to the lack of capacity on the part of the SAPS, has as a result of under-funding seen its contribution towards the RPP as well as borderline control decline from over 600 000 man-days in 1997/98 to some 300 000 man-days in 2000/01).

The deterioration in ResF capabilities may lead to a significant reduction in ready and trained personnel to sustain missions and deployments through the provision of relief forces, such as the case may be wrt certain deployments.

The operationalisation / commissioning and maintenance of new platforms resulting from the SDP acquisitions will probably necessitate / require a cheaper outlay on overall personnel expenditure to allocate more funds for the operating budget. In addition, the necessary combat and technical expertise needs to be proactively sourced and retained, not only by concentrating on measures to retain combat and technical expertise in the FTC, but also by concentrating on measures to align the ResF as a complementary supplier of more affordable expertise. The lack of implementation guidelines for the "One Force Model" hampers an integrated HR planning approach, which incorporates maximum utilisation of the ResF, to organise for the new acquisitions.

By not optimising the cost-savings potential of the preparation and utilisation of the ResF, the DOD will continue to spend too much on the RegF, thereby exacerbating an already tenuous position wrt the operating budget.

Given the current macro-composition of the DOD, specifically the SANDF, as well as associated problems wrt downscaling the FTC, the attainment of 40% personnel expenditure is unrealistic and unattainable over the medium term. A more realistic interim objective would be to "peg" personnel expenditure at 45% of the DOD budget.

As a result of the imbalance in prioritisation and resource allocation for the ResF, the DOD forfeits the opportunity to increase the representivity of the ResF through more intensive ResF marketing and recruiting.

The uncertainty regarding the nature, scope and depth of implementation of the "One Force Model" contributes to low-morale amongst RegF and ResF personnel alike.


Principal affirmation is required regarding the extent to which the DODís macro HR composition should be configured and particularly, to what extent the SANDF should pursue the "One Force Model" (especially considering the effect of limited financial resources). The Military Strategy should provide clear guidelines regarding the nature, scope and depth of integration required between the RegF and the ResF.


Since 1994, the size and shape of the DODís HR composition have dominated planning considerations. Ito the White Paper on Defence, Chapter 5, and the Defence Review, Chapter 10, the imperatives of a low conventional threat long-term scenario, the socio-economic upliftment priorities of government and the need to free more funds for the DODís operating purposes, require the DOD to increase the efficiency of its FTC. The DOD is also required to concurrently re-configure its HR composition to constructively reduce the combat-support ratio ("tooth-to-tail") and the RegF to ResF ratio. The optimal FTC constituting of uniformed personnel and Public Service Act personnel (PSAP) ratio, needs to be defined. The re-configuration of the DODís HR composition should also heed the defined guidelines iro representivity pertaining to factors such as race, gender, former force and disability.

Since the commencement of the transformation process, the DOD has substantially reduced its FTC from a peak strength of 101 353 in 1996 to 78 059 as at 15 July 2001, amounting to a reduction of 23%. Personnel reduction has been effected by means of natural attrition (eg resignations, retirements, transfers, selective non-renewal of contracts, discharges and death), the Voluntary Severance Package (VSP) initiative (1996 Ė 01) and the Employer Initiated Package (EIP) initiative (from 2001). Most of the above mechanisms are however voluntary, in that the individual can choose whether and when to separate. Despite available mechanisms such as the potential redeployment of personnel to other State departments and institutions, the DOD is not in a position to substantially expedite personnel reduction through the encouragement, and even less the enforcement, of separations in any significant way. The selective non-renewal of STS contracts only contributes to a partial solution.

The major obstacle preventing a substantial constructive reduction in personnel numbers, is the high national unemployment rate, currently estimated to be in the vicinity of 34%. Personnel who function as breadwinners, who have extended families to support and who do not possess scarce expertise, are most vulnerable wrt separation. A requirement therefor exists for a dedicated and comprehensive redeployment/reskilling/alternative job placement mechanism, to facilitate the empowerment and alternative job placement of personnel who can no longer be utilised.

Uncertainty about a defined and stable force design, force structure and establishment table, has led to a situation where estimates and linear projections driven by the need to reduce personnel expenditure, form the baseline for personnel reduction in particular, as well as HR planning in general. The appropriate and affordable total HR strength of the DOD, including the desired RegF to ResF ratio and the FTC uniformed personnel-PSAP ratio, is not clearly defined. Personnel reduction is therefore not implemented with the aim of reaching a definitive HR strength, because the steady end-state target strength is as yet uncertain. The Defence Review, Chapter 10, par 39.5, states that "Öa figure of approximately 70 000 is considered a viable Full-Time personnel componentÖ". Since the compilation of the Defence Review, various imperatives such as the SDP acquisitions, general improvements in salary conditions and the effect of new allowances, have however intervened. The appropriateness and affordability of a 70 000 strong FTC is therefore currently debatable and remains to be re-determined.

The DODís HR quantity dimension is still high on the corporate agenda and will remain so, but this will be a hollow debate if the quality dimension is not addressed. As most DOD personnel are aware of these requirements, morale and the retention of expertise are influenced by feelings of insecurity on the one hand and frustrations as a result of slow progress on the other hand.


A clearly defined and stable force design, force structure and establishment table are prerequisites for defining the appropriate and affordable size and shape of the DODís HR composition.

As a result of the fluidity in strategic planning, personnel reduction is not guided by a clearly defined establishment, but primarily by the urgent need to reduce personnel expenditure to liberate more funds for operating purposes so that the SANDF can execute its assigned mission.

The lack of an enforceable Exit Management Framework will continue to hamper efforts to expedite downsizing and rightsizing.

In the absence of appropriate separation enablers, such as an effective redeployment mechanism to grant personnel a high probability of finding alternative employment in civilian society, the DOD can expect significant resistance to any large scale downsizing exercise.

Lack of visibility regarding the steady end-state force design, force structure and establishment table may lead to a situation where personnel reduction continues apace, without due consideration of the adequate and appropriate number of personnel which may be required by the steady end-state force design. Base and unit closures which are not aligned with a definitive force design, force structure and establishment table, but implemented as part of cost-saving measures, may be regarded as a symptom of the lack of visibility regarding the steady end-state force design, force structure and establishment table

A seemingly interminable transformation process characterised by uncertainty regarding personnel reduction targets and the timeframe to attain a steady end-state strength, contribute significantly to low-morale.

Uncertainty regarding the steady end-state strength ito various ratios, particularly the RegF-ResF ratio, combat-support ratio and representivity ratios, not only impedes effective HR planning but also contributes significantly to low-morale.


The DOD needs a stable force design, force structure and establishment, which should serve to place the primary focus of personnel reduction and re-configuration processes on force requirements.

Personnel reduction and re-configuration will be required to configure the HR composition ito affordable force requirements and appropriate ratios. The DOD therefore needs appropriate mobility mechanisms to facilitate the successful redeployment of larger numbers of personnel into civilian society, with a particular emphasis on the finding of suitable alternative employment for such personnel. The will and support of all relevant stakeholders are required to ensure an affordable re-configuration of the DODís HR composition.


The HR quality dimension of a defence force is the product of various factors. Although there are unique influencing factors pertaining to individual defence forces, generic factors such as morale, the way that personnel serve (ie the cost-benefit dividend of service systems for the organisation and individuals), the level of personnelís education and training, their capacity to exploit the advantages of appropriate modern technology, exposure to operations, age, physiological, psychological and sociological health and wellbeing can all be regarded as primary drivers that determine the quality of a defence forceís HR profile. This analysis addresses those salient factors which currently impact negatively on the quality dimension of the DODís HR composition. (Note that morale is not addressed per se, as this factor has already been extensively dealt with in the strategy on low-morale and the loss of expertise).


The regular component of most modern volunteer defence forces, including the SANDF, relies on an employment approach comprising different service systems / components. These service systems, in general, make provision for

The intention of the FSS, implemented since 1994, was to lend greater flexibility and affordability to the SANDFís response to various threats. Instead of having to maintain a large and costly Permanent Force, it was approved that the SANDF should be able to rapidly adjust its HR strength according to the threat forecast. The STS should consist of the bulk of the SANDFís young and fit personnel, primarily with a view to potential deployment. This service system should therefore be characterised by constant rapid turnover which would ensure the rejuvenation of the bulk of deployable personnel as well as a much more affordable option to ensure bulk "feet on the ground". The MTS should accommodate middle-ranking personnel who are identified for medium term careers. The intention of the LTS was that it should downscale and eventually contain a smaller number of personnel who would form the essential command and management cadre of the SANDF. The peacetime FSS ratio was estimated to be STS: 40%, MTS: 40% and LTS: 20%.

Varied interpretation and implementation of the FSS has, however, led to thousands of STS personnel being translated to the MTS and LTS. As a result, the current FSS ratio is 13% STS : 39% MTS : 48% LTS. The cost implications of 87% of RegF personnel serving medium to extended long-term tenures are apparent. Perceptions of excessive rank inflation are also associated with the application of this system, where the bulk of personnel are not subject to rapid throughput and rejuvenation provisions. Whilst due recognition is given to integration imperatives that led to the extraordinary translation of most former Non-Statutory Force personnel to the MTS and LTS, the expansion of this measure to also include many former SADF and SANDF personnel is a major contributory cause of the skewed rank/mustering vs age pyramids in many of the combat corps. This factor impacts negatively on the SANDFís deployment potential.

Instead of leading to maximum flexibility and personnel expenditure savings, both the STS and MTS have, in general, merely become parts of a continuum that presents a perceived life-long career prospect to RegF personnel. The principle of rapid turnover to ensure a bulk of young and fit personnel for deployment has, more prominently in the case of the SA Army, not materialised.

The way that the FSS has been implemented until now has precluded the SANDF from the effective management of low-morale causal factors such as stagnation in rank, exceeding the optimal age-rank vs mustering criteria, consistent low performance and serious disciplinary problems. The general manifestation, causes and complexity of disciplinary problems fall outside the scope of this strategy and would require an in-depth study of the like of the Ministerial Inquiry on Transformation in the DOD (Setai Committee) to add substantive value to any disciplinary analysis. Suffice it to state that the way that the FSS has been implemented, has created numerous frustrations amongst members such as stagnation and unrealistic expectations of life-long employment in the SANDF, whether members continued to comply with their utilisation criteria or not, that have contributed to disciplinary problems. The FSS has therefore not served to provide the SANDF with an optimal return on investment employment structure.

The absence of suitable complementary systems and processes ("enablers") as part of the total service system "package" to make military service (especially service in highly specialised musterings) attractive and beneficial for the individual, have also contributed to the failure of the FSS to attract and retain scarce expertise. More recent retention initiatives, such as the implementation of a production bonus system for naval combat officers, only address one specific high expertise mustering. The ideal would have been for the FSS to embody a range of enabling mechanisms to retain scarce expertise across the board.

The way that the FSS is implemented detracts from the employment ethos and practice found in most contemporary volunteer defence forces, namely that the majority of SANDF RegF personnel do expect a life-long career in the RegF. This ethos is also consonant with contemporary civilian labour practice, namely that working people have to undergo life-long learning and continuous reskilling to enable them to migrate through a number of career changes, while adding value (bmo enhanced competency) to each successive career. Several career changes are the norm in the top performing economies of both the developed and the developing world. The majority of the regular personnel in such defence forces do in fact utilise their stint of military service as a launch pad to acquire valuable skills and experience, which they then profitably apply in civilian society. The defence force, in turn, is then also assured of a higher skilled national population base to call upon in cases of national emergency, or to fulfil other surge demands for military personnel, in fact creating a win-win situation which benefits the national economy, the defence force and the individual.

Although many defence forces world-wide successfully utilise term-service systems to regulate their HR requirements, most have complementary systems and processes ("enablers") in place which make the system work. Aspects such as vocational ETD as part of the term contract, which enable such personnel to re-integrate into civilian society as productive citizens, are given a high priority and focus. The structure of the relevant pension schemes also allows personnel to move out of the force at specific points of tenure with no loss of benefits or, alternatively, a sustainable pension. Unfortunately, no such "enablers" are as yet in place to support the FSS in the SANDF.


The FSS has largely failed to accomplish its aim, ie to grant optimal flexibility wrt force levels and affordability wrt personnel expenditure in the SANDF.

By not applying the FSS according to the prescribed implementation measures, the SANDF forfeited the opportunity to realise substantial savings on personnel expenditure, which could rather have been dedicated to the operating budget and increased defence outputs.

The way that the FSS is applied has significantly contributed to the deterioration of the (operational) quality of the SANDFís HR composition, as reflected in the age-rank vs mustering pyramids of particularly junior-level combat personnel.

The way that the FSS is applied does not create the required capacity for the constant rapid throughput of young and fit personnel, thereby contributing significantly to financial constraints and the inability to feed the ResF.

The absence of appropriate redeployment enabling mechanisms in the FSS deters personnel, especially those with less initiative and drive, from considering alternative employment and leads to stagnation, a general lowering of standards and low-morale.

Instead of contributing towards the constant rejuvenation of the SANDFís deployable personnel, the way that the FSS is applied hampers the deployment potential of the SANDF Ė the current system simply cannot effectively deal with / re-deploy personnel who can no longer be operationally utilised.

The way that the FSS is applied has led to unrealistic expectations that the SANDF should provide all its personnel with a life-long job, instead of being a first career stage after completing school. Insufficient communication on the nature and intent of the FSS have no doubt largely contributed to this state of affairs.


Given a limited budget, demanding operating requirements and increasing external deployment expectations, the principles of affordability and flexibility in force levels will continue to be pursued by the SANDF. The SANDF therefore requires a new service system, which is based upon accruing optimal cost-benefit advantages for the organisation.

Optimal cost-benefit advantages can only be realised if the SANDF pursues a rapid throughput approach wrt the bulk of its RegF personnel and implements enabling mechanisms that will make the retention of scarce expertise, as well as retraining and redeployment after a specified term of service, an attractive option for all personnel. This will also ensure the required feeding of the ResF.

The nature of the world of work and current employment practices, particularly the interrelationship between employment in the military and in civilian society, should be communicated to all SANDF personnel, even before they are employed. There should be no misunderstanding among prospective SANDF applicants that, although the SANDF can provide exciting and rewarding careers, life-long employment cannot be provided to all its personnel. The value-added benefits of service in the SANDF should also be articulated, especially in preparing personnel for possible future careers in civilian society.


Within the RegF, 52% of Privates (Pte) (10 151) (where the rank of Pte is applicable, read also the equivalent ranks of Amn (SAAF) and Smn (SAN)) are between 30 and 60 years old, while approximately 50% of junior non commissioned officer (NCOís) (Lance Corporal (L Cpl)) to (Corporal (Cpl)) (8 710)(Where the rank of L Cpl and Cpl is applicable read also the equivalent rank of AB and L smn), are between 30 and 60 years old. These age parameters by far exceed the optimal international rank-age norm for the stated ranks. The effect of the age imbalance is that Services, particularly the SA Army, carry significant numbers of combat personnel whose effective deployment potential is restricted as a result of their age. Most deployments, especially potential external deployments of extended duration (such as may be required for certain peace missions), require a bulk of young, fit and healthy soldiers who are not area bound and who are also unencumbered with extensive family commitments, ie being unmarried. The SA Military Health Serviceís (SAMHSís) Project RESILIENCE found that older personnel are generally more area bound, are loath to leave their properties unattended, are married and have family responsibilities, while they are generally less amenable to hard physical training. Older personnel generally have young families to support, with spouses being put in a difficult position to sustain the family while the members are away for extended periods. The positive factors of generally greater stability and maturity coupled with increasing age are however, offset by the negatives discussed above. The cumulative effect of the above factors, coupled with the number of personnel who exceed the required rank-age ratio, inhibit the SANDFís deployment potential.

Where age-rank parameters do not discernibly differ among the various junior ranks, command and control, as well as disciplinary problems, may result. In the case of the SA Army for example, the bulk of Pteís and junior leaders are approximately of the same age, with the average age of Cplís, L Cplís and Pteís being 33, 32 and 31 years respectively. In many instances the age of Pteís by far exceeds that of their junior leaders. A discrepancy of this extent inevitably leads to a loss in efficiency and tension in the ranks.

The ageing of the force is predominantly a concern wrt the SANDFís combat musterings and the effect thereof on deployment potential. It should be noted however, that the ageing of the force is also abetted by the absence of a tenure policy for middle and senior ranks that specifies the maximum term that should be served in the various ranks at these levels and which makes provision for exit and/or redeployment options. At middle and senior levels, the effects of stagnation can be as detrimental to morale, efficiency and productivity as the effects of age discrepancy at junior levels.

It should be noted that age-rank considerations also apply to the ResF. If the One Force Model is to be given effect, it is required that the ResF, like the RegF, has a feeder source comprising young, fit and healthy personnel. The leader group of the ResF, specifically, needs urgent rejuvenation and essential rectification iro its representivity.


The steadily increasing age of the bulk of the SANDFís deployable personnel can be expected to hamper force preparation, force employment and force sustainment.

The steadily increasing age of the bulk of the SANDFís deployable personnel will lead to increasing health care, housing and resettlement costs for the DOD.

The ageing of the force can mainly be attributed to the absence of a suitable service system with embedded enabling mechanisms which facilitate the retraining and redeployment of personnel who no longer comply with the age requirements for their musterings, as well as the absence of a maximum tenure in rank policy for middle and senior ranks to prevent stagnation.


One of the determining factors of a defence forceís operational effectiveness is that the bulk of its deployable personnel should be young, fit and healthy.

The SANDF cannot afford to reach a situation where its deployment potential is impaired as a result of the continuous increase in age of the bulk of its deployable personnel.

Enabling mechanisms are required to effectively re-deploy personnel whose age exceeds the acceptable rank-age vs mustering parameters and to ensure that adherence to these parameters are maintained, thereby preventing the recurrence of a similar situation wrt age incompatibility in which the SANDF currently finds itself.

A "tenure in rank" policy is required to prevent stagnation at middle and senior levels.


In 1999, the health status of SANDF personnel was registered as a strategic issue. The Exercise BLUE CRANE health assessments, as well as subsequent CHA, indicate that health non-compliance will increasingly negatively impact on the SANDFís deployment capability and, more specifically, its external deployment capability (especially the sustaining of peace missions). There is particular concern regarding the effect of disease, most prominently HIV/AIDS, on the external deployment capability of the SANDF, as well as the effect on cost escalation to maintain personnel who cannot be utilised. The most immediate health status challenges, from an HR perspective, include the continuous comprehensive quantification of disease prevalence within the SANDF; policy to manage the effect of HIV/AIDS; pro-active HR planning (in the widest sense and by all stakeholders) to ensure the continued availability of the required numbers of fit and trained personnel, as well as measures pertaining to the redeployment, reskilling and alternative employment of personnel who, as a result of their health status, can no longer be utilised within the SANDF.


The deterioration of the DODís personnel health status, primarily as a result of HIV/AIDS, constitutes the biggest single threat to the deployment potential and operational effectiveness of the SANDF, even over the long term or until such time as an HIV antidote/vaccine is found.

As HIV prevalence is more prominent among the age group between 25 to 29 years old (ie the age bracket that should provide the largest number of deployable personnel), the SANDF requires a constant rapid throughput of young, fit and healthy personnel to compensate for HR requirements resulting from the deteriorating health status of currently serving personnel.



Health status impacts on all HR sub-processes, ie personnel acquisition, staffing, ETD, career development, utilisation, maintenance and separation. Policy is required to address the management of personnel within the context of their health status, wrt each of the above HR sub-process areas.

A continuous influx and rapid turnover of young, fit and healthy personnel is required to guarantee the SANDFís deployment capacity, given the effects of health status.


The DOD is dependent on the quality of the supply-side from the open labour market. The reality of the South African situation is that the DOD is inundated with young people desperately seeking employment (with an official unemployment rate estimated to be 34%). Most of these job seekers, unfortunately, do not have subjects (specifically mathematics and science) which are in demand by the SANDF to meet its most critical combat, technical and professional HR requirements. The DOD must furthermore compete against a multitude of other employers who are also dependent on the limited annual turnout of top performers who meet the profile for employment in highly specialised occupations. It is expected that the capacity of the educational system to produce more technology-orientated school leavers at a sustained rate, will take some time.

The continuous attrition of highly trained and experienced personnel (owing to labour market pull-factors, low-morale and perceptions of career limitations) will complicate the operationalisation of the new platforms and systems resulting from the SDP acquisitions. This consideration, together with the requirements to normalise the representivity ratio in the SANDFís highly specialised musterings, as well as in the DODís highly specialised occupational classes (eg finance officials) and the need to minimise the DODís/SANDFís investment risk wrt expensive specialised training, will increase the necessity for the DOD to facilitate the continuous pre-employment ETD of a select number of school leavers to bring them up to par with the required educational standards for appointment in such musterings / occupational classes.

The above factors, as well as the investment risk inherent in the current employment-while-studying cost-benefit structure of certain musterings, may merit re-considering the extension of pre-employment ETD to cover certain categories of advanced and intermediate ETD. The payment of salaries and full benefits while personnel are studying full-time, fall-out rates while studying, re-mustering and retraining problems, as well as the retention rate upon obtaining of qualifications, do not provide an optimal return on investment. The outsourcing of certain categories of advanced training (eg student engineers) and intermediate training (eg apprentice training, which is not Service-unique), will amount to a cheaper option (the SANDF will not have to pay salaries and full benefits), higher quality (with final selection and SANDF employment occurring only after successful completion of studies) and, therefore, a lower investment risk.

In order to contribute towards solving the scarce expertise problem and the leader group problem within the ResF, pre-employment ETD opportunities in the form of a ROTC-type scheme should be considered to lure school leavers with a high development potential to join the ResF. The aim should be to offer tertiary training (which can lead to the award of Certificates, Diplomas and Degrees presented at the Military Academy) for young ResF officers who are appointed in combat and technical specialisations. In return for the study opportunity, such officers will have a contractual commitment to serve in the ResF for a specified period. This will ensure that the pool of scarce expertise in the RegF can be complemented with a more affordable source of scarce expertise.


There is a mismatch between the quality of education of most school leavers who seek DOD employment and the educational qualifications required by the DOD, particularly the SANDF, as a predominantly technology-based employer. The necessity of bridging the gap will gain prominence as the SANDF continues to modernise its capital equipment holdings.

An upswing in the economy can be expected to lead to even more highly trained and experienced personnel leaving the DOD for employment in the private sector, while top- performing school leavers, may in the majority of cases, not select the DOD/SANDF as an employer of first choice. This will reinforce the necessity for the DOD to facilitate the continuous pre-employment ETD of a select number of school leavers to bring them up to par with the required educational standards for appointment in the DODís/SANDFís highly specialised occupational classes/musterings. Specific investment in this regard should be considered as money well spent as a contribution towards the RDP.

The current employment-while-studying structure for school leavers, such as engineering students and certain apprentice trades, do not provide an optimal return on investment for the DOD.

By instituting a ROTC-type tertiary training scheme for the ResF, the DOD will be able to complement its diminished pool of scarce expertise in the RegF with an affordable source, at the same time also reinforcing the ResFís leader group element.


High volatility in the labour market, leading to a continuous outflow of expertise, and the problems experienced in attracting sufficient candidates with good mathematics and science marks will necessitate the pre-employment ETD of a select number of potential DOD/SANDF candidates as a medium to long-term feature.

The high investment risk potential of employing school leavers while they are studying full-time can be solved through the extension of pre-employment ETD to cover certain categories of advanced and intermediate training and by extending pre-employment ETD to include combat and technical officers in the ResF.


Affordable and flexible force levels can only be attained if there is an appropriate mechanism to facilitate the continuous throughput of personnel. The high unemployment rate deters serving personnel, particularly those who do not meet the high technology skills requirements currently in demand by the private sector, from leaving the employment of the DOD. The result is that many personnel who no longer meet the criteria for the posts in which they serve (especially wrt rank/age incompatibility or fitness), or who have little career advancement prospects (for whatever reason), have little option but to hang on to their current jobs and, in many cases experience stagnation and low-morale. The dilemma that this situation creates for the organisation, especially from an operational deployment and productivity point of view, is apparent. Currently there is no system in place that links tenure of service to an appropriate retraining and alternative job placement programme. Employment contracts, moreover, do not make provision for the exercising of such an option.

The only feasible way to ensure sustained and effective post-employment ETD and reintegration of personnel into civilian society is through the establishment of a one-stop service Redeployment Agency that makes provision for both the appropriate reskilling of personnel and their placement into alternative employment/occupations. The nature and scope of activities to be undertaken by such an agency will call for donor funding as well as an integrated public-private partnership programme.

In view of current socio-economic realities, especially high levels of unemployment, it is imperative that redeployment should occur in a seamless way. Individual members who have completed their term of service or who can no longer be effectively utilised, should be assessed ito their aptitude and civilian career preferences and aspirations; educated, trained and developed to specification for an alternative career and placed in alternative employment as part of an uninterrupted process of transition from military to civilian life. Such transition should furthermore occur within the context of an Exit Management Framework that is appropriately incentivised to grant appropriate recognition for service rendered in the DOD.


An integrated redeployment-retraining-alternative job placement system, which makes provision for all serving personnel irrespective of their service contract, is required to facilitate equitable separation, counter low-morale, address age-rank vs mustering discrepancies, prevent stagnation and improve efficiency in general.


In order to attain an affordable and effective HR composition, the SANDF requires an integrated one-stop service redeployment-retraining-alternative job placement system which accommodates the requirements of personnel whose term of service expires or who can no longer be effectively utilised.

The redeployment-retraining-alternative job placement system, should be facilitated and supported by an appropriate Exit Management Framework which is appropriately incentivised in order to encourage members whose term of service expires or who can no longer be effectively utilised, to be equipped for an alternative career in civilian society.




Since 1994 the DOD has made significant progress in improving representivity, especially ito race and gender. Recruitment, appointments, promotions and career development are executed in compliance with the relevant regulatory criteria for representivity. Three particular areas are apparent however, where the normalisation of representivity has not yet occurred.


Ito total personnel numbers, the DOD has generally attained an optimal level of representivity.

The focus over the short to medium term should shift towards normalising the state of representivity in the SANDFís professional and highly specialised combat and technical musterings, at middle-management level and at the entry level.

All existing measures should be activated and robustly implemented to enhance the attainment of broad representivity at all levels and in all musterings and post classes within the DOD in order to reach the guideline targets as stated in the Defence Review. Innovative ways should also be explored to assist with this process.


All "provide HR" processes should grant priority one attention towards normalising the representivity ratios within the SANDFís highly specialised and professional musterings; at middle management level and at entry level. Established processes to affirm Designated Persons, such as focused advertising campaigns for recruitment purposes, mentoring, coaching and fast tracking should be exploited. Other innovative measures such as "talent scouting"/"head hunting" throughout the public and private sectors should also be optimised.


The 17 000 odd PSAP constitute 21,7% of the total FTC. PSAP serve integrated with uniformed personnel in all Services and Divisions, in most occupational classes and at most levels. Due recognition is given to the fact that two different regulatory frameworks govern uniformed personnel and PSAP respectively. The reality however, as was found during the investigation into the strategic issue on low-morale, is that there is a perceptional "divide" between these two components ito management, career opportunities, career development and general treatment, giving effect to perceptions of discrimination against the PSAP component. The two different regulatory frameworks lead to differentiated managerial and administrative approaches and practices which are not conducive to a unified HR managerial ethos and management practices in the DOD.

The SANDF is and should by the nature of its mission, be a military (and predominantly uniformed-orientated) organisation. The nature of modern military operations, however, is such that civilian personnel are becoming more involved in deployments, including functioning in the theatre of operations, eg maintaining sophisticated weapons systems. This factor, as well as the high proportional PSAP representation in the DOD, necessitates close synergy and mutual understanding between the uniformed and civilian components. It ideally also calls for an integrated and preferably undifferentiating management and administrative system for all DOD and SANDF personnel.

The SA Police Service (SAPS) succeeded in amending the Police Act to include both its uniformed and civilian components under the provisions of the Act. The advantages and disadvantages of following a similar route wrt the DOD should be investigated.

Although it is not the intention that HR Strategy 2010 should address in detail any HR sub-process (functional) strategies (many of which will have to be developed and revised as a result of HR Strategy 2010), the macro "developmental-orientated" slant of the strategy would be amiss without addressing the position of those PSAP who occupy the lowest rungs (levels 1 Ė 3) on the employment scale. The DOD employs 10 643 PSAP on levels 1 to 3 who function as hygiene workers (cleaners), groundsmen (terrain workers and gardeners), food services aids (kitchen staff), messengers, etc. Dedicated and focused programmes to uplift the majority, if not all, of this category of employees ito appropriate ETD opportunities and programmes would serve to partially address historical inequities, improve morale and contribute to the vision that the total DOD should become a learning organisation. The practical benefits that such upliftment would entail for participating individuals and their dependants, as well as the organisation, would be substantial.


Factors which give rise to perceptional or real discrimination within the HR management and administrative ambit of a defence force are not conducive to cohesion and esprit deí corps. All the constituent HR components of the DOD should ideally experience substantive and procedural uniformity in managerial and administrative practices.

The focused upliftment of the lowest levels of PSAP through appropriate ETD opportunities and programmes will enhance efficiency, productivity and employee satisfaction in the DOD.


The feasibility of significant alignment of the differentiating regulatory frameworks governing uniformed personnel and PSAP respectively, as well as non-differentiating HR management practices and administrative measures for uniformed personnel and PSAP should be investigated.

Appropriate ETD opportunities and programmes with a dedicated focus to uplift PSAP employed on levels 1 to 3, should be implemented.


It is the "business" and raison dí être of the "provide HR process" to ensure that

Transformation, restructuring and concomitant uncertainties, the apparent prolonged staffing process, the advent of military unionisation and new responsibilities, delegations and lines of command resulting therefrom have, among other factors, contributed to the HR process being experienced negatively by many DOD personnel.

The absence of a single-point of responsibility for the total spectrum of HR management (as is vested in the HR Directors of most major corporate organisations), as well as the apparent "fragmentation" of the DODís HR management process, also contributes to the HR process being experienced negatively by many DOD personnel.

A reduction in expertise, a lack of experience and perceptions of inefficient client-service are also contributory factors. The nature and quality of HR service not only reflect on the commitment and professionalism of HR functionaries, but also convey a picture of service rendering by the total DOD. Should personnel have a negative experience wrt HR service rendering, they will tend to blame the corporate DOD. HR service rendering therefore represents an image of the total DOD.

All the factors necessary to ensure efficient HR service delivery can, however, be addressed within the "provide HR" process itself, thereby contributing to the desired end result.

From a strategic perspective, the following areas can be regarded as the "pillars" on which the effective execution of the HR process stands:


HR are the DODís most important asset. The absence of a single-point HR management responsibility to co-ordinate and orchestrate the management of this asset, especially given the requirements of concluding the "unfinished business" of (HR) transformation, therefore seems to be an anomaly.

Labour peace is essential for defence outputs. Sound labour practices should therefore form an integral part of commandersí and managersí daily actions.

All DOD/SANDF personnel should be aware of their rights and responsibilities ito sound labour relations.

HR functionaries apparently do not sufficiently realise that the quality and efficiency of their outputs reflect on the image of the corporate DOD.

As all the factors necessary to ensure efficient HR service delivery can be addressed within the "provide HR process" itself, the factors which inhibit the capacity to do so need to be monitored constantly and redressed through policy reworking and consistent practice according to the policy.

It should be questioned to what extent the DODís HR management competencies comply with the special demands of transformation and, especially, with the demands for client orientation and service delivery.

The DOD requires comprehensive, up to date, easily understood, expertly communicated and easily accessible policies which cover all the "provide HR" sub-process domains.

The DOD requires client-focused HR practices which eliminate red tape, which are user-friendly, which empower personnel to be responsible for their personal HR administration, and which are based on best practice and supported by professional research and development.

The efficiency of the existing DOD personnel and salary system and the proficiency of its operators and users need to be revisited in the quest for better service delivery and efficient HR management.

The quality and effectiveness of complaints and grievances management can be enhanced at all levels of command through the establishment of a central IT database to monitor the status of ministerial enquires, questions in parliament, queries, complaints and grievances and to facilitate prompt progress feedback to personnel concerned. Such a mechanism will also contribute towards client satisfaction and higher morale.

The DODís "provide HR" process should be based on modern best practices, at the outset of personnel acquisition to separation.


The structural capacity of the "provide HR" needs to be enhanced through the elimination of fragmentation and through the continuous improvement of coordination amongst HR sub-processes.

Service delivery needs to be enhanced, particularly by improving the HR process systems and process capacity, as well as the client-focussed attitude of HR functionaries.

There should be a centre of labour relations excellence within the DOD to provide specialists for negotiation and specialist labour-relations support and training. It can be expected that the unionisation of SANDF members in particular will increase, and this will require such a centre of excellence to provide the appropriate support to commanders and managers, as well.

The appropriateness and standard of the DODís HR management competencies need to be revisited.

Effective HR policy which governs all the "provide HR" sub-process domains, should be continuously updated according to changing needs.

The imperatives of a standard user-friendly IT HR management tool and the training of users and operators requires urgent attention.

The effectiveness of command communication needs to be enhanced through a central standardised IT database that records and tracks the progress of all queries, complaints and grievances. This should expedite the processing of queries, complaints and grievances, thereby reducing membersí frustration resulting from undue lead-times and contributing towards better client service.







Cognisance should be taken that the "HR management domain", in its broadest sense, interacts and is closely aligned with every facet of management, from organisational structure design and the legal and disciplinary domains to health matters and communication. It is therefore impossible to cover all HR-related issues in this strategy. Managerial matters which are already being addressed in other DOD processes, such as crime (being addressed in terms of the DODís Strategy on Criminality), health status (being managed in terms of the DOD Instruction on the Management of SANDF Members within the Context of their Health Status), Full Range Leadership Development (being addressed as part of the DOD Leadership, Command and Management Principles [LCAMPS] Programme) and morale (being addressed in terms of the Strategy on Low Morale and the Loss of Expertise), may therefore be alluded to, but are not reiterated in this strategy.

HR Strategy 2010 presents a macro HR strategic direction to the DOD, to be followed over the period 2001 to 2010. This strategy addresses the high-level HR management alignment of the DOD in order to enable the effective and efficient execution of the DODís mission. HR Strategy 2010 should therefore serve as a guideline for the development and/or amendment of AOT policy and strategies to address the generic HR sub-processes of personnel provisioning, ETD, career development, utilisation, maintenance and separation, and to inform the development of other DOD/SANDF strategies.

Linkage Between the SANDF Military Strategy and the DOD HR Strategy 2010. As a result of the urgent need to provide HR strategic direction to the DOD/SANDF, the DOD HR Strategy 2010 was developed as a Support Strategy. Perceptions may exist that the strategy should still be aligned with the requirements of the Military Strategy. The HR Strategy 2010 was developed to meet the HR requirements posed by the Military Strategy and is, as such, fully aligned with and supportive of, the objectives of the Military Strategy. Robust articulation is, however, required to affirm the DOD HR Strategy 2010 as a key Support Strategy and enabler of the SANDF Military Strategy. Without an effective, efficient and economical HR composition having the right people in the right places at the right times, the ends of the Military Strategy, ie to support the people, to provide regional security and to provide defence against aggression, will not be able to be accomplished.

The DOD HR Strategy 2010 provides human resource strategic direction. It is a transformational/change management strategy and not an implementation plan. Therefore, like any other strategy, it should not be equated with an implementation plan. Detailed planning instructions/directives to give effect to the strategy, should be formulated and promulgated as part of the DODís broad transformation and "provide human resources" processes.


The DOD wants its HR composition to be competently managed in the interests of both the organisation and the individual and to have an HR composition which is effective, efficient, economical, equitable, motivated, productive and professional. It is therefore developing an institutional culture and occupational ethos based on professional conduct (as well as military professionalism in the case of uniformed personnel), service delivery, individual empowerment and pride in the organisation and its common values. This developing institutional culture and occupational ethos should serve as unifying forces which transcend all potential historically derived divisive factors.

The DOD has a first and foremost responsibility to ensure that its macro-HR management, including the way that personnel serve, is executed in such a way that its corporate mission can be executed in the most effective, efficient and economic way. This calls for a new employment ethos for uniformed personnel which is in line with international practice, discarding the inherited "cradle-to-grave" stagnation-riddled and unproductive employment ethos in favour of a more flexible and developmental-focused way of serving, thereby releasing more funds for operational commitments while also ensuring a regular throughput of well-qualified personnel who, having completed an optimal stint of military duty, can assume meaningful occupations in civilian society and contribute to the strengthening of the economy. Through this new approach, the One Force Model, as expounded in the Defence White Paper and Defence Review, will truly become effective.

The DOD recognises that its outputs depend on the contribution of each individual as well as on the collective efforts of the organisation. Individual empowerment through education, training and development, ranging from pre-employment ETD to post-employment reskilling and reintegration into civilian society, therefore enjoys a high priority to ensure that the DOD has the "right quantity and quality of personnel".

The DOD recognises that current as well as future defence demands will increasingly call for a workforce which is predominantly technology-orientated. It therefore contributes to youth academic development to fulfil its own recruiting needs, at the same also employing all reasonable means to retain scarce expertise, fully cognisant that scarce expertise is a prerequisite to maintain a technologically advanced defence force. Once lost, scarce expertise is very difficult to reacquire and takes a long time to reintegrate into the organisation, thereby presenting a strategic risk.

Finally, the DODís HR philosophy takes into account the need to practice HR management in such a way that the DOD and SANDF will have a well-disciplined, motivated and happy workforce. Without discipline, a military force cannot exist, much less participate in operations and deployments. Without motivation there can be no effective soldiering, or soldiers may find their necessary support lacking. Unless personnel are happy in what they do and in the way that they experience the organisation, there can be no esprit de corps, trust and pride in the organisation.

All leaders and managers in the DOD and SANDF must pledge themselves to practice this HR management philosophy.


The DODís HR management vision is that all commanders, managers and HR functionaries will competently manage the DODís most important asset, its HR. Competent HR management will result in a DOD which comprises an effective, efficient, economical, empowered, motivated, well-managed and diverse workforce, willing and capable of executing the DODís mission.


The mission of HR management in the DOD is to support the DODís corporate mission and strategy by providing effective, efficient and economic HR of the quality and quantity commensurate with the DODís needs, as regulated by the Constitution, national legislation as well as parliamentary and executive direction.


The following HR strategic issues are derived from the current HR realities:



The following critical success factors are required for the successful implementation of the HR strategic objectives:


The Desired End States state the results that should be obtained by implementing the high level goals. The goals represent the ends which should be achieved to realise the Desired End States. Only once the DOD has realised the Desired End States, will the HR strategic issues be solved and HR Strategy 2010 have reached its aim, ie "to ensure the availability of the right quantity and quality of HR in the right places at the right times, who are effectively, efficiently and economically managed and administered".

Current Service System Configuration

New Service System Configuration

Ser No


Strength as at 15 Jan 03

No of Pers

70 000 model

% of Total Full-time Compo-nent (DAP and PSAP)

Average Cost of

70 000 model (projected in 2002 Rand value)



No of Pers

70 000 model

% of Total Full-time Compo-nent (DAP and PSAP)

Average Cost (projected in 2002 Rand value)













27 259

25 336


2 732 918 312


10 998

15,71% (note 1)

1 186 321 266



26 931

25 028


1 715 769 512


21 995

31,42% (note 2)

1 507 845 230



4 847

4 504


247 873 136


21 995

31,42% (note 3)

644 178 562






5 364 120

















16 152

15 012


982 445 328


15 012


982 445 328



75 318

70 000


5 684 370 408


70 000


4 320 790 386

Note 1: The SCS comprises 20% of the Regulars (full-time uniformed component).

2: The CSS comprises 40% of the Regulars (full-time uniformed component).

3: The MSD comprises 40% of the Regulars (full-time uniformed component).

4: The projected savings resulting from full implementation of the new service system, as indicated above, is R1 363 580 022 per year, ie amounting to a reduction of 23,9% in the personnel budget.



The attainment of the nine desired end states described above should lead to the Strategy achieving its aim "to ensure the establishment of the most effective, efficient and economical Defence HR composition, of the right quantity and quality in the right places at the right times".

Most of the ways to achieve the stated goals will require significant effort and the will to execute. The success of this strategy is dependent on the support of all commanders and managers at all levels, as well as the support of stakeholders in civil society. As a result of fundamental transformational change that the implementation of the strategy will bring about, it is envisaged that the DOD will engage principal stakeholders in a participative interaction mode as implementation unfolds.

A detailed HR Strategic Implementation Plan will be promulgated to guide execution of this strategy.


A: A Critique of Human Resource Strategy 2010 Within the Context of the

SANDFís Readiness Levels. 2003. Parliamentary Information Services Research: Cape Town

B: Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996

C: Decision Brief to the Council on Defence on a New Service System Concept for Defence Act Personnel (DS/CPP/D HR PLAN/R/104/31 dd 27 October 2000)

D: Defence Act, 1957 (Act No 44 of 1957, as amended)

E: Department of Defence Affirmative Action Plan

F: Employment Equity Act, 1998 (Act No 55 of 1998)

G: General Regulations for the SA National Defence Force and the Reserve

H: Labour Relations Act, 1995 (Act No 66 of 1995)

I: National Treasury Instructions

J: Public Finance Management Act, 1999 (Act No 1 of 1999)

K: Public Service Act, 1994 (Proclamation 103 of 1994, as amended)

L: Public Service Labour Relations Act, 1994 (Act No 105 of 1994)

M: Public Service Regulations

N: South African Defence Review, 1998

O: South African National Defence Force Personnel Strategy: 1996/7 Cycle (CSP/D PERS PLAN/C/501/6 dd 29 May 1996)

P: South African White Paper on Defence, 1996

Q: White Paper on Affirmative Action and Equal Opportunity

R: White Paper on Transformation of the Public Service, 1995